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Abstract
his study tried to investigate if intuitive ideas about the continuation of the Self after death 
determine the way people represent the state of being dead, and, in this way, investigate possible 
psychological origins of afterlife beliefs, which constitute a recurrent cultural phenomenon. 
A semi-structured interview and a self-report questionnaire were used to obtain information on 
the experience of imagining oneself as dead and the representation of the dead-I of young adults. 
he results suggest that (1) there is a tendency to imagine the state of being dead as a continuation 
of the I, even in the absence of explicit afterlife beliefs; (2) perceptual, emotional, epistemic and 
desire experiences are associated to the dead-I; (3) the representation of the dead-I seems to be 
determined by an interaction between cognitive processes related to self-awareness and theory of 
mind, and the cultural afterlife beliefs explicitly learned. A previous alternative hypothesis, 
suggesting that simulation constraints were responsible for the emergence of non-reﬂective 
afterlife concepts (Bering, 2002, 2006) is not completely supported by our results. he data 
presented here suggest that immortality of the soul might be an intuitive religious concept, 
connected to the experience of the Self and to the implicit theorization that the experienced Self 
is independent from the body. Future studies should focus on the collection of cross-cultural and 
developmental data. 
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he last decades have witnessed a revision of cultural relativism and an increas-
ing amount of interest in the identiﬁcation of universal cognitive mechanisms 
responsible for inter-culture similarities (Brown, 1991; Pinker, 2002). Recent 
reviews of the concept of Culture, made by anthropologists like Boyer (1994), 
Brown (1991) or Sperber (1996), stressed the importance of the identiﬁcation 
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of recurrent cultural elements in the investigation of cognitive mechanisms 
typical of the human species. 
Beliefs in afterlife are a recurrent and prevalent characteristic of Human 
Culture, since they seem to be an essential element of religious thought in all 
known human cultures (Morin, 1970; homas, 1976; Obayashi, 1992). 
Birket-Smith (1955) ventured that the only cultures that do not show afterlife 
beliefs are those in which those beliefs were not researched. his inter-cultural 
recurrence and prevalence over time may be a sign that humans have an intu-
itive tendency to understand death as the continuity of existence.
he natural or cognitive origins of afterlife beliefs (AB) have recently been 
explored through studies centered in the representation of dead agents 
(Bering, 2002, 2006; Bering and Bjorklund, 2004; Bering et al., 2005). 
Assuming a simulational account of the theory of mind (Goldman, 1992, 
1993; Harris, 1992), according to which the inference of internal states of 
other agents is made using our own experiences as a reference, Bering (2002) 
predicted that when we try to imagine what it would be like to be dead, we 
would try to imagine what it is like to “be an agent that is dead” through the 
same simulational mechanisms we use in our daily lives to predict and explain 
the behaviour of social agents. Death is an unknown experience for everyone, 
and because of that, the reliance on our introspection to imagine what a 
dead agent might be is a problem, since we have no personal information on 
which we can rely. 
It follows that while trying to imagine the total lack of physical and mental 
states that death supposedly is, we would be confronted with two distinct 
kinds of states: those the absence of which is very easy to imagine (EIA), 
because we have experienced it on our daily lives, and those the absence of 
which is diﬃcult to imagine (DIA), since we never or only rarely experience 
their absence. Examples of DIA states are epistemic (thought), emotional 
(fear, joy), and desire (will) experiences. Examples of EIA states are biological 
(eating, drinking), psychobiological (hunger, sexual desire) and perceptive 
(seeing, hearing) experiences.
According to this idea, the dead agents should be imagined as experiencing 
mainly those states the absence of which is more diﬃcult to imagine. With 
this simulation constraint hypothesis in mind, Bering (2002) conducted a 
study in which he told a story of an imaginary agent who had died. After read-
ing the story, the participants were asked to judge whether Biological, Psycho-
biological, Perceptive, Emotional, Desire and Epistemic states continued after 
the death of the agent. A response was coded as continuity reasoning if the 
biological or mental state was considered to function despite the agent’s death; 
discontinuity reasoning code was used when participants judged the biological 
or mental state as ceasing to exist as a result of death.
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he author veriﬁed that the emotional, desire and epistemic states were the 
ones more frequently attributed to the dead agent. He found that the same 
pattern occurred for diﬀerent types of AB and that even participants that did 
not believe in any form of afterlife (extinctivists) gave a superior amount of 
continuity reasoning responses to epistemic states than the rest of the sample.
Despite this general pattern of responses, the AB type had some eﬀect on 
the answers, since participants that stated they believed in reincarnation had 
the higher number of continuity reasoning responses, while those who classi-
ﬁed themselves as extinctivists were the ones who gave less continuity responses. 
For Bering (2002), this result indicates that subject’s responses express an 
interaction between their culturally acquired AB and their intuitive notion of 
what might be the internal states of dead agents.
Pyysiäinen (2003) criticizes the simulation constraint hypothesis, since 
there is no empirical evidence sustaining diﬀerences in the diﬃculty to imag-
ine the absence of mental states. He claims that the absence and cessation of 
certain emotional and desire states is frequent, e.g., the experience of absence 
of the will to do something. his author suggests that an alternative hypothesis 
to Bering’s simulation constraint hypothesis might be the degree in which 
experiences are usually perceived as dependent on the body. Pyysiäinen (2003) 
proposes that while thinking about dead agents people focus on the types of 
experiences they could continue to have without a body. 
he notion that we are “common sense dualists” condemned to believe in 
God and the afterlife (Bloom, 2004, 2007) is compatible with the ideas of 
authors (Bauman, 1992; Freud, 1915/1957; Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003) that 
suggested that it is impossible for human beings to imagine the complete 
death of themselves, even if the end of their body is easily conceivable. his 
impossibility may result from the phenomenological tendency in humans to 
imagine their own deaths from the perspective of a spectator: “It is indeed 
impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so we 
can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators” (Freud, 1915/1957, 
p. 289).
Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) proposes that the afterlife beliefs are a conse-
quence of the human capacity to experience the Self simultaneously as a subject 
and an object. hese two modalities of self-awareness have been identiﬁed and 
described in psychological literature by a myriad of authors ( James, 1890; Duval 
and Wicklund, 1972; Damásio, 2010), all of them emphasizing the diﬀerence 
between the awareness of Self as a subject of experience, an agent in the world, 
and as an object possible to be examined from a distant perspective. 
Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) denominates the experience of the Self as a 
subject as Subject-Self and the experience of the Self as an object as Object-
Self. he Subject-Self corresponds to the centre of agency and representation 
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of the world to which we usually call “I”, and is felt as independent on the 
body. Strawson (2009) refers to it as “self-experience” which corresponds to 
the sensation of being a cohesive, continuous, internal/mental subject of expe-
rience, that is aware of itself, has emotions, thoughts and intentions and a 
certain personality. Sá-Nogueira Saraiva’s (2003) Object-Self, or “Me” in 
James’s (1890) terminology , corresponds to the image we create of ourselves 
and is associated with the body and other public aspects of the Self, such as 
physical appearance.
According to Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003), the duality between Subject-Self 
(I) and Object-Self (Me) inevitably emerges when we try to imagine our own 
death: it appears in our imagination as the death of an object – ourselves – that 
is observed by a subject – ourselves as well. his cognitive incapacity to elimi-
nate the Self as the subject of experience would constitute the psychological 
basis for the emergence of intuitive notions about the continuation of a part 
of the Self after death, expressed in the cultural recurrent beliefs related to the 
immortality of the soul (Eliade, 1951/1968; Morin, 1970).
In this study, we propose to investigate if there is a tendency to imagine 
death as a state of continuation of the I or Subject-Self (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 
2003), and to understand the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the way 
in which people implicitly represent their dead-I. Speciﬁcally, we intend to 
clarify if representations of the dead-I are determined by the simulation con-
straint proposed by Bering (2002), by an implicit theory about the degree of 
body dependence of various mental states (Pyysiäinen, 2003), and/or by the 
assumption of continuity of the I (or Subject-Self ) with the same characteris-
tics that are associated to it in life (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003). he hypoth-
esis of Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) and Pyysiäinen (2003) are compatible, 
since both assume that the characteristics associated to the dead-I are those 
perceived as somehow independent on the body. he proposals of Bering 
(2002) and Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) also have contact points, since both 
authors presume a cognitive constraint that prevents us from imagining the 
end of all types of experience. he diﬀerence lies in the fact that Sá-Nogueira 
Saraiva (2003) considers the importance of the phenomenological experience 
of being an I or Subject-Self, while Bering (2002) centres his proposal in 
the functioning of our simulational abilities, without reference to the “Self-
experience” (Strawson, 2009).
If Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) is correct, and the phenomenological experi-
ence of the I aﬀects the way people represent their own deaths, it is expected 
that the dead-I is represented in the same way as the I experienced in life, and 
that it might have, besides emotional, epistemic and desire states, also percep-
tive ones, because the self-experience is usually associated with mental images. 
Since the I is implicitly conceived as independent on the body (Sá-Nogueira 
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Saraiva, 2003), the degree in which a mental state is perceived as body depen-
dent could also determine if it would be attributed to the dead-I. his last 
prediction is also in accordance with the proposal of Pyysiäinen (2003).
If Bering’s (2002, 2006) proposal applies to the representation of one’s own 
death, it is expected that epistemic, emotional and desire states should be 
attributed to the dead-I in superior proportion to perceptive and psychobio-
logical states, independently of the degree in which they are perceived as body 
dependent.
An additional objective of this study is to understand how explicit cultural 
beliefs about afterlife inﬂuence the implicit representations of the dead-I.
Method
Participants
Research participants were 40 young adults, half of each sex between 20 and 
30 years of age (mean±SD 24.98 ± 2.30 years), living in Lisbon, 75% of which 
are recent graduates and 25% are undergraduate students, of various courses. 
Participants were recruited by email. hey were asked to participate in a study 
in which they would have to talk about personal feelings and thoughts about 
their own death. Most of the sample (57.5%) has experienced the death of 
someone close in less than 5 years, which might be a sign that mourning is a 
common experience in this age range. he religious background of the sample 
is mainly Catholic, but only 5% of participants still consider themselves as 
Catholic. Only 30% of the sample believes in God or other supernatural force/
being. Participants who had a suicidal history, a chronic or terminal disease or 
relatives with terminal disease where excluded from the sample.
Procedure
Having in mind the exploratory nature of this study, a semi-structured inter-
view was chosen as the data gathering technique, since it was considered that 
the speciﬁc questions necessary to collect the desired information might vary 
in each interview, according to diﬀerent interviewer–interviewee dynamics 
(Pollio et al., 1997/2006). he semi-structured interviews were based on a 
script (see Appendix A) that prescribed the themes to explore and some pos-
sible relevant questions, without imposing a rigid order of questions. It was 
assumed that the interviewer might improvise to match the rhythm of each 
interview (Mason, 1998). 
A questionnaire, speciﬁcally constructed to collect information about the 
degree of body dependence attributed to various kinds of experiences, was also 
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presented during the interview. his questionnaire includes 25 items repre-
sentative of psychobiological, perceptual, epistemic, emotional and desire 
experiences (see Appendix B).
Before initiating the interview, the participants were told that we were 
interested in their personal perspective and that there were no right or wrong 
answers. We asked permission to record the interview (conﬁdentiality and 
anonymity being assured).
After some ice-breaking questions, participants were asked to “concentrate, 
close their eyes for some seconds and try to imagine what it is like to die and 
be dead”. Participants were then told to report what they thought during the 
exercise. If the answers did not refer to the dead-I (e.g., just saying “everything 
dark”, or “people crying”), additional questions were asked to try to get infor-
mation about the represented dead-I: “If you had to imagine yourself in a life 
after death, independently of what you believe will happen after death, how 
would you be like?” 
After the implicit representation of the dead-I had been clariﬁed through 
questions about the diﬀerent kinds of experience it might continue to have, 
the Degree of Body Dependence (DBD) Questionnaire was presented. Using 
a four-point scale (ranging from “Totally independent on the body” to 
“Totally dependent on the body”), participants were asked to evaluate the 
degree in which they felt that each experience listed in the questionnaire is 
dependent on the body. hey were instructed to base their evaluations on 
what they feel in their daily lives and not on their scientiﬁc knowledge. 
Participants were further asked to indicate, based on the imagination exercise 
conducted earlier, which of the 25 experiences listed in the DBD Question-
naire might continue after death. 
At the end of the interview, we collected information about the explicit 
beliefs in afterlife of the participants, as well as their religious beliefs: “Do you 
believe in any form of afterlife?”, “Do you consider yourself a religious 
person?”, “What is your religious belief ?”
hese questions were left to the end of the interview to prevent contamina-
tion of the answers by the explicit beliefs in afterlife.
Results
his study had a mixed methods design, using a semi-structured interview 
that was complemented with a quantitative instrument, the DBD Question-
naire. We will ﬁrst present the results obtained from the analysis of the inter-
view data, and then the results obtained with the questionnaire. 
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Qualitative data analysis
We used NVivo 7 software and adopted a simultaneous bottom-up and 
top-down procedure to analyze the data collected in the interview, following 
the guidelines suggested by Miles and Huberman (2004). he main categories 
(tree-nodes) were deﬁned a priori and correspond to the three themes of 
the interview script (Experience of imagination of one’s own death, Implicit 
representation of the dead-I and Explicit beliefs in the afterlife). Sub-
categories (child-nodes) were based on patterns that emerged from the data 
(see Appendix C for examples of responses coded in the nodes presented in 
this section).
Table 1 presents the types of AB identiﬁed in the sample, that correspond 
to the child-nodes inside the Explicit beliefs in the afterlife tree-node.
Table 1
Explicit Beliefs in the Afterlife – Child-Nodes and their Operational Deﬁnition
Types of explicit 
beliefs in afterlife
Operational deﬁnition of the node No. of participants 
coded in each 
child-node (%)
Non-belief in the 
afterlife
Lack of any kind of belief in an afterlife. 23 (57.5%)
Afterlife possible 
but uncertain
Life after death is considered possible, 
psychologically plausible and desirable, but 
there is uncertainty about its existence. 
Afterlife is seen as a continuation of the I, 
that would maintain consciousness of itself 
and a signiﬁcant part of the mental capacities 
held in life (e.g., memory and thought). 
4 (10.0%)
Afterlife in 
another 
dimension
After death, the I continues to exist outside 
the Earth, in another dimension, keeping the 
same psychological traits and the memories 
of the previous life. Interaction with other 
selves is usually possible in that other 
dimension, which is compared to the 
Christian Heaven.
6 (15.0%)
Afterlife 
without an I
A part of the person continues to exist after 
death without a center of consciousness, or I 
(Self ), that is aware of itself and exists as a 
bounded entity.
4 (10.0%)
Afterlife 
undeﬁned
Belief in afterlife accompanied by uncertainty 
about how and what that afterlife might be.
3 (7.5%)
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Most of the participants are non-believers in afterlife (57.5%). Almost all the 
other types of AB identiﬁed seem to assume the continuation of the I in an 
afterlife.
he type of afterlife belief does not vary according to sex (χ2=0.102, df=1, 
p=0.794) but seems to be associated with age (χ2=5.013, df=1, p=0.025), since 
60% of the participants aged between 26 and 30 years believe in some kind of 
afterlife and only 25% in the range between 20 and 25 years do not show any 
kind of belief.
Table 2 presents the child-nodes created to code the responses to the imag-
ination exercise proposed in the beginning of the interview. A non-exclusive 
codiﬁcation was used for these nodes and the same participant can be associ-
ated to several categories.
he majority of the sample (75%) has imagined the state of being dead as a 
state where self-experience continues present. Almost half of the participants 
(42.5%) reported the sensation of imagining death in the perspective of a 
spectator. Only one participant focused in the moment that anticipates death.
he tree-node Implicit representation of the Dead-I includes two sub-
categories – Types of representation of the dead-I and Experiences of the 
dead-I –, each of them with several child-nodes. Table 3 presents the diﬀerent 
Types of representation of the dead-I.
he participants showed a tendency to represent the dead-I as similar to the 
I experienced in life (87.5% of the sample).
Table 4 presents the child-nodes of Experiences of the dead-I, created to 
code the answers about the types of experiences that the dead-I can have. 
Again, a non-exclusive codiﬁcation was used for these nodes. 
he results showed that the experiences mostly associated to the dead-I 
were Perceptual (82.5%), Epistemic (67.5%) and Emotional (40%). he per-
ceptual experiences most attributed to the dead-I were Vision (77.5%) and 
Hearing (35%). In the Epistemic node, the experiences mostly associated with 
the dead-I were Consciousness (45%), Memory (37.5%) and hought (30%). 
A slight percentage of the sample (17.5%) has attributed to the dead-I the 
capacity to move.
Relationship Between the Type of Explicit Belief in Afterlife and the Other Nodes
In order to understand if diﬀerent AB are associated with diﬀerent kinds of 
imagination experiences and representations of the dead-I, the NVivo7 Matrix 
coding query option was used to explore the relation between the diﬀerent 
tree nodes.
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Table 2
Experience of Imagination of One’s Own Death – Child-Nodes and their 
Operational Deﬁnition
Types of Experience 
of imagination of 
one’s own death
Operational deﬁnition of the node No. of 
participants 
coded in each 
child-node (%)
Continuation of the 
I
he state of being dead is imagined as a state 
in which the I, but not the body, continues 
to exist, in the form of psychological activity 
such as consciousness, memory and even 
perceptual abilities, like vision. 
30 (75.0%)
Observation of one’s 
own death
During the imagination exercise there is the 
feeling of being the observer of one’s own 
death and not an active participant in it. he 
state of being dead is imagined in the 
perspective of a spectator that witnesses the 
death of the body, as if it belonged to 
another being.
17 (42.5%)
he I that continues 
is connected do the 
body
Death is imagined as a state of continuation 
of the I, which remains physically close to 
the body (in some cases inside the coﬃn), as 
if it were still connected to the body. 
11 (27.5%)
Impossibility of 
imagining death as a 
total end
Imagination exercise is accompanied by the 
feeling of being very diﬃcult or even 
impossible to imagine death as a total end of 
existence.
14 (35%)
Absence of the I he imagination of death as the deﬁnitive 
end of existence. he state of being dead is 
imagined as the absence of any mental or 
bodily activity. he idea of inexistence and 
emptiness is also present.
 9 (22.5%)
Imagination of the 
moment before 
dying
Imagination of the moment just before 
death, in which death is already expected 
but is not happening yet. 
 1 (2.5%)
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Table 3
Types of Representation of the Dead-I – Child-Nodes and their Operational 
Deﬁnition
Types of 
representation of 
the dead-I
Operational deﬁnition of the node No. of 
participants 
coded in each 
child-node (%)
Dead-I similar to 
the one held in life
Dead-I similar to the one held in life, with 
the same psychological characteristics, the 
same cognitive and perceptual capacities, 
memory of past events and awareness of 
itself. Some answers report also the 
capability of the dead-I to have the ability to 
move and touch.
35 (87.5%)
Dead-I distinct 
from the one held 
in life
Dead-I is diﬀerent from the I experienced in 
life. he awareness of being the same I (Self ) 
as in life is lost, as well as the memories of 
the life before. Dead-I could be dismantled 
and only an “essence” of the person 
continues in another body and another I 
(Self ). he I (Self ) loses the status of 
separation relatively to the world and other 
Selves, occurring a fusion, with the loss of 
its frontiers. 
3 (7.5%)
Dead-I non-existent With the death of the body, the self is lost. 
Existence after death could not be imagined.
2 (5.0%)
Among the ﬁve types of AB, the experience of Continuation of the I was the 
most frequent. Even 60.9% of the non believers reported this kind of experi-
ence. Despite this general pattern, explicit AB seem to inﬂuence in some 
degree the experience of imagining one’s own death, since only the partici-
pants that do not believe in afterlife imagined death as the Absence of the I. 
Dead-I similar to the one held in life was the more frequent type of repre-
sentation in all types of AB, with the exception of Afterlife without an I, for 
which the representation of the Dead-I distinct from the one held in life was 
equally frequent. he representation of the Dead-I as non-existent was only 
reported by participants that do not believe in any form of afterlife, but even 
in that group, only 6.5% responded in that way.
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he perceptual, epistemic and emotional experiences were attributed to the 
dead-I by all types of AB. Concerning the frequency in which the experiences 
were reported, all types of AB showed the pattern “perceptual>epistemic>
emotional”, except for Afterlife undeﬁned (where the pattern was “perceptual>
emotional>epistemic”) and Afterlife without an I, which did not show diﬀer-
ences in the frequency of attribution of various kinds of experiences to the 
dead-I (“perceptual=epistemic=emotional”). 
Despite the similarities found, there are diﬀerences in the percentage in 
which each speciﬁc experience was attributed by each type of AB to the 
dead-I. For instance, 78.3% of Non-believers in an afterlife have considered 
that the dead-I might have visual experiences, while for the believers in an 
Afterlife possible but uncertain, Afterlife in another dimension and Afterlife 
undeﬁned that percentage reached 100%. he percentage of emotional expe-
riences attributed to the dead-I was larger for Afterlife possible but uncertain 
and Afterlife undeﬁned groups (75 and 66.7%, respectively), than for non-
believers in an afterlife (34.7%) and believers in Afterlife in another dimen-
sion (33.3%). he attribution of epistemic experiences was more frequent for 
Afterlife possible but uncertain (75%) and Afterlife in another dimension 
(83.3%) than for the remaining groups. Curiously, non-believers in an after-
life presented a higher percentage of this kind of responses (69.6%) than the 
Table 4
Experiences of the Dead-I – Child-Nodes and their Operational Deﬁnition
Types of 
experiences of 
the dead-I
Operational deﬁnition of the node No. of 
participants 
coded in each 
child-node (%)
Psychobiologic Internal states connected with physiological 
necessities, like feeling hungry, thirsty or feeling 
sexually stimulated.
0 (0.0%)
Perceptual Sensations from of all sensorial modalities, like 
vision and olfaction.
33 (82.5%)
Emotional Emotions and feelings. 16 (40.0%)
Epistemic Cognitive activity involving thought processes 
and memory.
27 (67.5%)
Desire Internal states connected with desire and 
intention.
3 (7.5%)
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group of believers in an Afterlife without an I (25%) and an Afterlife unde-
ﬁned (33.3%).
In general, there seems to be a tendency, not dependent on the explicit 
beliefs in afterlife, to attribute perceptual, epistemic and emotional experi-
ences to the dead-I. he explicit beliefs can however inﬂuence this trend since 
the belief in any kind of afterlife tends to increase the attribution of experi-
ences to the dead-I, except when those beliefs are contrary to the permanence 
of the I after death. 
Quantitative Data Analysis
Experiences that Continue and do not Continue after Death. Figure 1 presents 
the percentage of continuity responses for each of the 25 items of the DBD 
Questionnaire. 
We used the binominal test to identify which of the 25 experiences were 
evaluated by more than 50% of the sample as being possible and not possible 
to continue after death. Results showed that seven experiences were consid-
ered by signiﬁcantly more than 50% of the participants as possible to continue 
after death: Concentrating on a subject (75%, p=0.002), Being in love 
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Figure 1. Percentage of continuity responses for the 25 items of the DBD Questionnaire 
(dotted lines correspond to the 95% conﬁdence interval around 50%).
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(70%, p=0.017), Feeling the will to do something (73%, p=0.006), Laughing 
(70%, p=0.017), Wishing to be with someone (73%, p=0.006), hinking 
about myself (83%, p=0.000) and Remembering moments from the past 
(85%, p=0.000). On the contrary, eight experiences were considered by sig-
niﬁcantly less than 50% of the sample as being possible to continue after 
death: Feeling hungry (7%, p=0.000), Being sick (2%, p=0.000), Initiating 
a project (20%, p=0.000), Feeling thirsty (7%, p=0.000), Touching 
something (13%, p=0.000), Feeling hot (5%, p=0.000), Smelling a ﬂower 
(23%, p=0.000), Tasting an ice-cream (5%, p=0.000).
he results suggested that the experiences considered possible to continue 
after death belong exclusively to the epistemic, emotional and desire catego-
ries (with the exception of the Initiating a project experience), while psycho-
biological and perceptual experiences were not considered possible to continue 
in the afterlife.
Experiences Classiﬁcation as More or Less Body Dependent. Figure 2 presents 
the percentage of responses in the higher values of the scale about degree of 
body dependence, for the 25 items of the DBD Questionnaire. Since the dis-
tribution of participants through the levels of the response scale was very 
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Figure 2. Percentage of dependent on the body responses for the 25 items of the DBD 
Questionnaire (dotted lines correspond to the 95% conﬁdence interval around 50%).
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irregular, the original four-points scale was transformed into a dichotomous 
variable: (1) Independent on the body (totally independent to slightly depen-
dent) and (2) Dependent on the body (moderately to totally dependent).
Using the binominal test, we found that only four out of the 25 experiences 
were considered as dependent on the body by signiﬁcantly more than 50% of 
the sample: Feeling hungry (95%, p=0.000), Being sick (90%, p=0.000), 
Feeling thirsty (93%, p=0.000), Feeling hot (98%, p=0.000). Test results also 
showed that only a small number of participants (signiﬁcantly below 50% of 
the sample) considered the following experiences as dependent on the body: 
Listening to music (23%, p=0.001), Looking at a painting (10%, p=0.000), 
Feeling angry with a friend (15%, p=0.000), Concentrating on a subject 
(15%, p=0.000), Being in love (30%, p=0.017), Learning new things (15%, 
p=0.000), Initiating a project (20%, p=0.000), Feeling the will to do some-
thing (25%, p=0.002), Feeling happy because of good news (10%, p=0.000), 
Laughing (18%, p=0.000), hinking about a problem (10%, p=0.000), Mak-
ing a decision (5%, p=0.000), Wishing to be with someone (13%, p=0.000), 
hinking about myself (0%, p=0.000), Remembering moments of the pass 
(3%, p=0.000), Wanting to reach some goal (15%, p=0.000), Feeling anxious 
(28%, p=0.006). Finally, four experiences – Sexual desire (65%, p=0.810), 
Touching something (60%, p=0.268), Smelling a ﬂower (57%, p=0.430), or 
Tasting an ice-cream (57%, p=0.154), did not reach consensus among par-
ticipants related to their degree of body dependence. 
Association Between Continuation after Death and Degree of Body Dependence 
We found a signiﬁcant negative correlation between continuation after death 
and degree of body dependence for the 25 items considered in the BDB Ques-
tionnaire (Spearman’s rho=‒0.709, p=0.000): experiences with higher per-
centages of positive continuity responses tend to be considered less dependent 
on the body. Figure 3 depicts the association between these two variables. 
In Figure 3 we can identify six kinds of experiences: (1) experiences consid-
ered independent on the body and simultaneously possible to occur after 
death (circles; N=8); (2) experiences evaluated as independent on the body 
but regarded as not possible to continue after death (squares; N=8); (3) experi-
ences evaluated as independent on the body and which continuity in the after-
life was implausible (diamond; N=1); (4) experiences evaluated as dependent 
on the body and considered non possible to occur after death (triangles; N=4); 
(5) experiences that did not reach consensus about their dependence on the 
body but signiﬁcantly regarded as not possible to continue in the afterlife 
(stars; N=3); and (6) experiences reaching consensus neither about their degree 
of body dependence nor continuation after death (hexagon; N=1).
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No experience was simultaneously considered possible in the afterlife and 
dependent on the body. Apparently, independence of the body seems to be a 
criterion to consider an experience as possible to continue after death. How-
ever, the contrary might not hold true: experiences can be regarded as impos-
sible to continue even when they are evaluated as independent on the body 
(squares are an example). hese results suggest that independence of the body 
is not the only factor taken into account when deciding which experiences 
might be a part of the dead-I’s existence.
he Eﬀect of Explicit Beliefs in Afterlife in the Kinds of Experiences Considered 
Possible to Continue After Death
Due to their small dimensions, the ﬁve AB groups were collapsed into two 
categories: one constituted by non-believers in an afterlife (N=23) and the 
other constituted by all types of believers in any form of afterlife which assume 
the continuation of the I (N=13). hese two groups diﬀer minimally in respect 
to the types of experiences they tend to consider possible after death. Only 
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two experiences seem to have been evaluated diﬀerently by the groups: 
“Listening to music” (with a greater proportion of continuity responses from 
the believers group, χ2= 8.493, df=1, p=0.004) and “hinking about myself ” 
(with the opposite pattern, with non-believers giving a bigger percentage of 
positive responses than the believers group, χ2=5.143, df=1, p=0.023).
Discussion
he hypothesized human tendency to imagine death from the perspective of a 
spectator (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003, 2012; see also Bauman, 1999; Freud, 
1915/1957) was supported by the data collected during the interviews, since 
the majority of the sample imagined the state of being dead as a condition 
in which the I continues to be experienced. his trend was independent on 
the type of explicit AB and was present even in the Non-believers in the after-
life group.
Additionally, the hypothesis that the Subject-Self (I) remains after the death 
of the bodily parts of the Object-Self (Me) is also supported. Many partici-
pants (almost 50%) have reported that they imagine their own death as some-
thing that they “observe”, as if a part of themselves remained alive watching 
the burial of the body. A third of the participants (35%) explicitly said that 
they felt it was impossible to imagine death as the complete absence of them-
selves, and some have even stated that they tend to believe in some form of 
afterlife since they cannot imagine the end of themselves: “(. . .) the disappear-
ance of all that is around me is an aberration (. . .) that’s why I think it could be 
possible to be something that survives without the body, because it’s diﬃcult imag-
ining a consciousness disappearing.” (Int. 39, male, 23 years old). 
he preserved dead-I seems to be represented as similar to the one experi-
enced during life. his result may indicate that while trying to imagine what 
life after death might be, people assume the continuation of their Subject-Self 
or I in accordance to the proposal of Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003). Qualitative 
and quantitative data have shown that the experiences attributed to the dead-
I were the epistemic, emotional, desire and perceptual (in the form of vision 
and hearing). his pattern occurred for all kinds of AB, including the partici-
pants who do not believe in any form of afterlife. Despite similarities, qualita-
tive data suggests that speciﬁc cultural beliefs inﬂuence the way the dead-I is 
conceived. For instance, the belief in any form of afterlife seems to increase the 
attribution of experiences to the dead-I, except when AB denies the perma-
nence of the I after the death of the agent (Afterlife without an I). 
We also found that the attribution of an experience to the dead-I appears to 
be related to its degree of body dependence, in accordance with predictions by 
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Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) and Pyysiäinen (2003). A negative correlation 
between judgements of afterlife continuity and body dependence was found 
for the 25 experiences analyzed, suggesting that the experiences with higher 
percentages of positive continuity responses tend to be considered less depen-
dent on the body.
Judgements about the kinds of experiences the dead-I can have appear to be 
guided by implicit theories about the nature of the Self and its relation with 
the body, derived from the phenomenological experience of the I or Subject-
Self. he experience of the I as immaterial (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003) might 
contribute to the creation of an implicit association between the I and the 
experiences and mental states perceived as independent from the body.
Experiences which were evaluated as dependent on the body are not attrib-
utable to the dead-I. he contrary, however, might not hold true: experiences 
can be regarded as impossible to continue even when they are evaluated as 
independent on the body (e.g., “Making a decision”). his result suggests that 
the degree of body dependence is not the only factor taken into account when 
judging which experiences the dead-I might have. his may be because of 
cultural expectations about what is supposed to happen in a life after death. In 
fact, several participants stated that many items in the DBD Questionnaire 
described experiences incongruent with their general ideas about afterlife: 
“I don’t see myself initiating projects over there, it would be a calm life, without 
work!” (Int. 37, female, 28 years old) or “I would be able to listen to sounds, but 
I don’t think music would be possible to be heard on the afterlife. I would not have 
a radio out there!” (Int. 33, female, 26 years old). his may explain why so 
many experiences evaluated as independent on the body were not attributed 
to the dead-I, and why perceptual experiences (visual and auditory) were so 
much spontaneously attributed to the dead-I during the interview but did not 
reach a signiﬁcant consensus when their afterlife plausibility was evaluated 
with the DBD Questionnaire. Future studies should address this drawback, 
using this information to guide the construction of more adequate items.
he simulation constraint hypothesis suggested by Bering (2002) is not 
supported by our data. Although emotional, epistemic and desire/agency 
experiences were among the most often attributed to the dead-I, and partici-
pants in our sample referred visual and auditory experiences as possible in the 
afterlife. he interview data revealed that the spontaneous attribution of visual 
experiences to the dead-I is even more frequent than the attribution of 
epistemic, emotional and desire/agency experiences. If, as the simulation con-
straint hypothesis suggests, the diﬃculty of imagining the absence of certain 
mental states were the fundamental criteria involved in the determination of 
the types of experiences the dead-I can have, visual experiences should not be 
attributable to the dead-I, since Bering (2002) considers them as EIA states. 
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Interestingly, in Bering’s factorial analysis of the attributed experiences, per-
ceptual experiences clustered together in the same factor with the DIA states, 
and not, as the author expected, in the same factor as the EIA states. 
Our results suggest that vision and hearing are evaluated diﬀerently from 
the other sensorial modalities, and associated with the dead-I in the same or 
even higher percentage than epistemic, emotional and desire/agency experi-
ences. In fact, the degree of body dependence evaluations of these two kinds 
of experience is closer to the evaluations of epistemic, emotional and desire/
agency experiences than the other perceptual experiences in the DBD 
Questionnaire. In the light of the data collected in this study, it makes sense 
that visual and auditory experiences should appear together with the DIA 
experiences as conceived by Bering (2002), and not with other perceptual 
experiences. 
Since Bering’s (2002) study focused on the representation of dead agents, 
and our study is about the representation of one’s own death, the diﬀerent 
results about perceptual experiences might be due to the diﬀerent nature of 
the tasks proposed in each study. Future research should be able to clarify if 
the representation of dead agents and the representation of one’s own dead-I 
are tasks involving the same cognitive mechanisms.
he association of visual and auditory experiences to the dead-I cannot be 
explained by a simulational constraint like the one suggested by Bering (2002, 
2006), but is compatible with the hypothesis of Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) 
that assumes that the notion of the survival of the soul after death results from 
the impossibility of eliminating the experience of the I as a subject of experi-
ence and centre of agency (see also Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2012). If the dead-I 
is represented as a continuation of the I (Subject-Self ) experienced in life, it 
will be characterized by important aspects of the phenomenological experi-
ence of being an I, namely mental images and internal dialogue, so frequent 
in our internal spaces of representation. he capacity to “see and hear men-
tally” is, therefore, inherent to that experience, contributing to their dissocia-
tion from the body in as much as the body is the object part of the I. 
Additionally, vision and hearing are also the dominant sensorial modalities 
in humans and our sense of agency in the world might be intensely related to 
the possibility of perceiving that world through these senses. his association 
between the I and perception could also explain why ethnographic data show 
that ghosts are rarely or never represented as blind or deaf (Whitehouse, 2006). 
he responses of some participants appear to support the idea that the 
capacity to perceive the world around us could be felt as an integrant part of 
the I, relatively independent on the body: “For me, vision . . . I forget it comes 
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from the body, it feels like it comes from me, it’s probably an illusion, but it is what 
I feel, I feel that it is mine, that it comes from within, and it is one of the major 
ways to construct and know the world around me” (Int. 39, male, 23 years old). 
“[when imagining myself dead] I see the darkness, as if I was locked in a room 
without any light. I felt that some auditory sense might still exist. If I think, I speak 
to myself and I can, at least, still hear myself.” (Int. 26, male, 24 years old). 
Studies with blind or deaf subjects could help clarify the eventual role of 
other sensorial modalities in the representation of the dead-I. 
Immortality of the Soul as an Intuitive Religious Concept
he data collected in this study suggest that the experience and implicit theo-
rization of the Self appears to be of consequence to the representation of one’s 
own death. he necessity of including the concept of the Self in theoretical 
accounts of religious phenomena has been recognized some years ago (Bering, 
2006). Our results suggest that the phenomenology of the Self should be taken 
into account when investigating religious phenomena like afterlife beliefs. 
he representation of one’s own death is inevitably constrained by the expe-
rience of the Self. In fact, the emergence of objective self-awareness (Duval 
and Wicklund, 1972), i.e., the capacity to be aware of themselves as objects in 
the world, appears to have allowed human individuals to be aware of their 
own death (Silvia, 2001). At the same time, the impossibility of eliminating 
the experience of the I (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003), while imagining its own 
death, may have made humans prone to distinguish two kinds of Self: one that 
is identiﬁed with the body that dies and with the external and social aspects of 
the Self, that James (1890) called “Me”, and is denominated as Object-Self by 
Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003), and another, felt as immaterial and somehow 
disconnected from the body, that seems to be capable of surviving physical 
death (the I or Subject-Self ). Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) advanced that the 
classical distinction between two types of souls in ethnographic literature – 
ego/free soul and life soul (Hultkrantz, 1953/1997, 1967/1979; Bremmer, 
1983/1993) – could be the cultural elaboration of these two perspectives of 
the Self experienced by humans – Subject-Self (I) and Object-Self (Me), 
respectively. his suggestion is further supported by the many cases in which 
a person (the Subject-Self/ I) can leave the body or assume diﬀerent bodies 
and by the frequent metaphor of the body as the soul’s horse (see references in 
Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2012 and a major review in Eliade, 1951/1968).
his proposal could explain the “fundamental paradox” identiﬁed by Morin 
(1970): at the same time that Humans are capable of understanding that life 
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is ﬁnite, they tend to consider the continuation of themselves after death as 
plausible, since a part of the Self is experienced as potentially immortal.
If the immortality of the I is phenomenologically plausible, as we are argu-
ing, then ideas about the continuation of mental processes after death could 
be generated even in the absence of contact with explicit afterlife beliefs. he 
notion of an immortal soul could be an intuitive religious concept, potentially 
emergent in human minds despite speciﬁc culture indoctrination. Afterlife 
beliefs could have had their origin in these intuitive notions, their speciﬁcities 
being the result of an intricate and long process of cultural elaboration.
We are aware of the diﬃculty in studying psychological origins of cultural 
phenomena. Human children receive explicit cultural information from a 
very early age, and it is diﬃcult to know if ideas about the preservation of the 
I after death are present before contact with cultural explicit notions of immor-
tal souls or ghosts. We think it is reasonable to assume that although contact 
with afterlife cultural notions occurs before or concomitantly with the ﬁrst 
thoughts about death, the success of transmission of cultural afterlife beliefs is 
dependent on the already existing latent tendency to intuitively conceive the I 
in a way that favours the attribution of certain mental processes and experi-
ences to the dead. Without this predisposition, cultural ideas about the after-
life would not be meaningful for people contacting with them for the ﬁrst 
time, and would probably be discarded as nonsense. Afterlife beliefs are 
“sticky” ideas (Boyer, 2003) precisely because they resonate with our intu-
itions about the nature and characteristics of the Self and Body. he fact that 
developmental studies (Bering and Bjorklund, 2004; Bering et al., 2005) 
showed that the tendency to represent dead agents as capable of mental states 
might be present since infancy is clearly relevant in this context. 
Although we do not assume that immortal souls are innate ideas, com-
pletely independent from cultural learned information, we think our data and 
previously collected data (Bering, 2002; Bering and Bjorklund, 2004; Bering 
et al., 2005) are evidences favoring the possibility that non-reﬂective beliefs 
(Barrett, 2003) in the continuation of the experience of the I and of various 
mental states after death are potentially present in human minds. 
Concerning the possible direct evolutionary origins of intuitive afterlife 
concepts, Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2012) suggests they emerged as a by-product 
of human self-awareness and theory of mind typical functioning. We consider 
it is premature to assume the possibility of an evolved religious psychological 
system (Bering, 2006), since the reproductive advantage of believing in an 
immortal soul or agent is not obvious. he extensive commentaries to Bering’s 
(2006) article emphasize the need for caution in this regard. 
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Future Directions
he proposed hypothesis that the immortality of the soul is an intuitive or 
non-reﬂective religious idea makes sense in the light of our data, but needs to 
be addressed by additional studies before it can be adequately tested.
To start, our results were obtained from a very speciﬁc sample, so we 
are not conﬁdent about their generalization to the entire adult population. 
he constitution of a larger and more heterogeneous sample, in terms of age, 
academic habilitations and religious beliefs, might oﬀer more generalizable 
results.
he controversy in the literature about the origin of afterlife beliefs – cogni-
tive predisposition (Bering, 2002, 2006; Bering and Bjorklund, 2004; Bering 
et al., 2005) or cultural learning (Harris and Astuti, 2006; Astuti and Harris, 
2008) – has been sustained by contradictory ﬁndings in developmental as well 
as cultural data and accentuates the need for more cross-cultural and develop-
mental studies in this area.
If the phenomenology and representation of the Self contributes to the 
emergence of intuitive afterlife concepts that constitute psychological origins 
of afterlife beliefs shared by humans, we should be able to ﬁnd some regularity 
in Self-experience and Self ’s implicit theorization across cultures.
A large body of evidence demonstrates that the Self is a cognitive and phe-
nomenological entity recognized and discussed in various cultural contexts 
(Strawson, 2009). he rich descriptions of, and lively debates about, the con-
cept of soul in all complex cultures (see Martin and Barresi, 2006 for the 
occidental tradition and Watson, 2006 for the oriental tradition), as well as 
the theorization about Ego and Free souls in simpler cultures (Hultkrantz, 
1953/1997, 1967/1979), are evidence of the prevalence of the Self. In fact, it 
has been argued that language could not exist without a sense of self because 
the perpendicular pronoun and the ﬁrst person declensions are, by deﬁnition, 
self-referential (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2012; Sá-Saraiva and Sá-Saraiva, in 
press). It has been argued that the Self has many precursors in non human 
motile animals (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2012), and Damásio (2010) has rein-
forced this view by claiming that even consciousness could not have developed 
in humans without the previous emergence of a sense of Self. Also, theory of 
mind appears to be a universal mechanism in the human species (Wellman 
et al., 2001; Quintanilla and Sarriá, 2003; Oberle, 2009) dating from at least 
500 000 years ago (Sá-Saraiva and Sá-Saraiva, in press), or even earlier (Ship-
ton, 2010), and theory of mind is not possible without a self-experience. We 
therefore suggest that there is a good chance of the Self structure and experi-
ence being universal, despite already recognized cultural speciﬁcities (Markus 
and Kitayama, 1991; Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, 2010). 
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Understanding the way in which people of various cultural contexts experi-
ence and implicitly represent their selves might be an important step to under-
stand the recurrence and prevalence of the belief in an immortal soul that 
might live after bodily death. Afterlife beliefs and the related questions 
of the Self therefore seem to be a window into future studies of religion 
and cognition.
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Appendix A
Script for the Semi-Structured Interview
heme 1
Experience of imagining one’s own death 
1.1) I would like to ask you to make a little imagination exercise. Concentrate and try to imag-
ine what it would be like to die and to be dead. Close your eyes, take a deep breath and 
concentrate on the task. Try to imagine this without worrying about the logical sense of 
your fantasy or what might be right or wrong. Tell me the ﬁrst images and thoughts that 
you had during the exercise. 
1.2) What have you imagined?
1.3) While imagining yourself dead, did you felt as an observer or a participant? (to use only if 
not mentioned spontaneously by the interviewees)
1.4) Was it diﬃcult to imagine your own death? What diﬃculties come up? 
1.5) Was there anything that you imagined that seemed strange or contradictory?
heme 2
Representation of the dead-I
2.1 If participants response about the imagination experience reports a continuation of the I 
after death, without giving enough information about the characteristics and kinds of 
experiences the dead-I might have (try to follow what is spontaneously referred by the 
interviewees, in order to avoid inﬂuencing too much their representation of the dead-I):
 2.1.1)  When you imagined yourself dead, what happened to your mind, to your conscious 
experience? Did you imagine that it ended when your body stopped functioning? 
 2.1.2)  Having in mind the way in which you imagined yourself as a dead person, what 
experiences made sense that you could continue to have in that life after death? 
 (according to the type of experiences mentioned, you should pose more speciﬁc 
questions and try to understand if epistemic, emotional, desire/agency, psychobio-
logical and perceptual experiences might continue after death). 
2.2 If participants’ imagination of the dead state does not hold a continuation of existence of 
the I after death: 
 2.2.1)  If you had to imagine a life after death, independently of what you belief will hap-
pen after you die, how would it be?
 2.2.2) What kind of experiences could you have in that afterlife?
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heme 3
Identiﬁcation and characterization of religious beliefs of participants, mainly their conceptions 
about what happens after death to the body and self.
3.1) Do you believe in any form of life after death? Can you explain me a little bit more what 
you actually believe will happen when you die? 
3.2) How would you deﬁne you religious beliefs?
Appendix B 
DBD Questionnaire
Please, evaluate the following experiences in respect to the degree that you feel them as more or less 
dependent on the body. Try to ignore your scientiﬁc knowledge about this matter and respond 
only according to the way you feel each experience in your daily life. Use the following scale to 
evaluate each of the experiences presented: 1-Totally independent on the body; 2- Slightly depen-
dent on the body; 3-Moderatelly dependent on the body; 4-Totally dependent on the body
Experience Degree of body 
dependence
(Portuguese version) (English version)
 1. Sentir fome Feeling hungry 1 2 3 4
 2. Ouvir uma música Listening to music 1 2 3 4
 3. Estar zangado(a) com um amigo Feeling angry with a friend 1 2 3 4
 4. Concentrar-se num assunto Concentrating on a subject 1 2 3 4
 5. Estar doente Being sick 1 2 3 4
 6. Estar apaixonado por alguém Being in love 1 2 3 4
 7. Aprender coisas novas Learning new things 1 2 3 4
 8. Iniciar um projecto Initiating a project 1 2 3 4
 9. Vontade de fazer uma coisa Feeling the will to do something 1 2 3 4
10. Desejo sexual Sexual desire 1 2 3 4
11. Observar um quadro Looking at a painting 1 2 3 4
12. Ficar feliz ao receber uma boa notícia Feeling happy because of good 
news
1 2 3 4
13. Rir Laughing 1 2 3 4
14. Pensar sobre um problema a resolver hinking about a problem 1 2 3 4
15. Tomar uma decisão Taking a decision 1 2 3 4
16. Desejar estar com alguém Wishing to be with someone 1 2 3 4
17. Sentir sede Feeling thirsty 1 2 3 4
18. Tocar numa coisa Touching something 1 2 3 4
19. Pensar sobre si próprio hinking about myself 1 2 3 4
20. Recordar momentos do passado Remembering moments from 
the past
1 2 3 4
21. Querer alcançar certo objectivo Wanting to reach some goal 1 2 3 4
22. Sentir calor Feeling hot 1 2 3 4
23. Cheirar uma ﬂor Smelling a ﬂower 1 2 3 4
24. Saborear um gelado Tasting an ice-cream 1 2 3 4
25. Sentir ansiedade Feeling anxious 1 2 3 4
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Now please, signal the experiences of this list that you think might continue after death, accord-
ing to what you imagined a while ago. Please, try to separate your beliefs about the afterlife 
from what you imagined. Some experiences might make sense in light of the imagined scenes 
that do not correspond to your beliefs. Focus in what you imagined and not necessarily in 
what you believe. 
* * *
Note: he items of the DBD questionnaire were classiﬁed into the following categories: Psycho-
biological experiences (1. Feeling hungry; 5. Feeling ill; 10. Sexual desire; 17. Feeling thirsty; 22. 
Feeling hot), Perceptual Experiences (2. Listen to music; 11. Observing a painting; 18. Touching 
something; 23. Smelling a ﬂower; 24. Tasting an ice-cream), Emotional Experiences (3. Feeling 
angry with a friend; 6. Being in love; 12. Feeling happy for receiving good news; 13. Laughing; 
25. Feeling anxious) and Desire/agency experiences (8. Initiating a project; 9. Feeling the will to 
do something; 15. Making a decision; 16. Desiring to be with someone; 21. Wanting to reach 
some goal).
Appendix C
Examples of Answers Coded in Each Node
A) Explicit beliefs in the afterlife
A1) Non-belief in the afterlife
 “I think that we die and that’s it ( . . .) what remains here is the works you did in life. I do 
not believe in any form of life after death.” (Int. 17, female, 22 years old) 
A2) Afterlife possible but uncertain
 “Death doesn’t make sense ( . . .) Because of what it is to be aware of oneself, I am not talking 
about thoughts in themselves but the consciousness behind those thoughts. he sensation of 
being alive, the sensation of existing should not end because we stop breathing and the organs 
shut down, it doesn’t make sense! It just doesn’t make sense, so I tend to think there must be 
some form of survival of consciousness.” (Int. 40, male, 23 years old)
A3) Afterlife in another dimension 
 “I imagine a place apart from here. My Catholic education makes me imagine that it’s 
somewhere above the earth, from where people can see their relatives that are still alive.” 
(Int. 37, female, 28 years old)
A4) Afterlife without an I 
 “I think that it wouldn’t be an identity, because identity is connected to speciﬁcity and I 
think that an existence after death would be one of connection to the absolute and not to 
speciﬁcity. Me, as an individual, will probably end.” (Int. 10, male, 24 years old)
A5) Afterlife undeﬁned
 “here is something, but I don’t know how it will be.” (Int. 38,female, 26 years old)
B) Experience of imagination of one’s own death 
B1) Continuation of the I 
 “I am surrounded by darkness and I’m aware of that darkness and of myself.” (Int. 40, 
male, 23 years old)
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B2) Observation of one’s own death 
 “he only thing I see is myself dead ( . . .) I see myself dead on the ﬂoor and I am already out 
of my body looking for my dead body from above.” (Int. 14, female, 27 years old)
B3) he I that continues is connected to the body 
 “I saw them above me, like I was in my body, inside the coﬃn and was observing them but 
they did not notice that.” (Int. 5, male, 25 years old)
B4) Impossibility of imagining death as a total end
 “I cannot imagine myself dead! I can imagine that I’m dead and everyone is here around me 
grieving and crying, but I am observing, like they could not realize that I’m with my eyes 
open looking at them.” (Int. 5, male, 25 years old)
B5) Absence of the I
 “I tried to imagine what it would be like if a subject observing reality ceased to exist. A 
sensation of emptiness of inexistence.” (Int. 30, male, 27 years old)
B6) Imagination of the moment before dying 
 “I did not imagined myself dead, it was more the process of dying. I was sick in a hospital or 
something like that.” (Int. 36, female, 30 years old)
C) Implicit representation of the Dead-I
C1) Types of implicit representation of the dead-I 
C1.1) Dead-I similar to the one held in life
 “Without a body but with consciousness, memories from the past, capacity to feel and 
having sensations that although physical, would remain now as sensations of con-
sciousness, like if consciousness kept the sensorial characteristics of the body.” (Int. 
39, male, 23 years old)
C1.2) Dead-I distinct from the one held in life
 “It would be like being connected to everything around us. he feeling of belonging, 
of not being a separated individual. A state after death would be of fusion, not sepa-
ration as in life.” (Int. 13, male, 22 years old)
C1.3) Dead-I non-existent
 “I just imagined the absence of consciousness, I tried to imagine the unconsciousness 
of myself ( . . .) I cannot imagine any kind of life after death, it doesn’t make sense.” 
(Int. 8, female, 26 years old)
C2) Experiences of the dead-I 
C2.1) Psychobiological
 “I imagine that things like feeling hungry, having to go to the bathroom, taking a 
bath would not be present, since the body ceases to exist.” (Int. 1, female, 26 years old)
C2.2) Perceptual
 “Hearing I think I would not be able, the body is inanimate! But curiously, I imag-
ined I still was able to see!” (Int. 23, male, 26 years old)
C2.3) Emotional
 “I imagine myself still able to have emotions and feelings.” (Int. 26, male, 24 years old)
C2.4) Epistemic
 “It would be just a more mental activity, remembering and thinking, and stuﬀ like 
that.” (Int. 24, male, 24 years old).
C2.5) Desire/agency
 “I would still want to be near the persons I like.” (Int. 35, male, 20 years old)

